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How do local topological changes affect the global operation and stability of complex supply
networks? Studying supply networks on various levels of abstraction, we demonstrate that and how
adding new links may not only promote but also degrade stable operation of a network. Intriguingly,
the resulting overloads may emerge remotely from where such a link is added, thus resulting in
nonlocal failure. We link this counter-intuitive phenomenon to Braess’ paradox originally discovered
in traffic networks. We use elementary network topologies to explain its underlying mechanism for
different types of supply networks and find that it generically occurs across these systems. As
an important consequence, upgrading supply networks such as communication networks, biological
supply networks or power grids requires particular care because even adding only single connections
may destabilize normal network operation and induce disturbances remotely from the location of
structural change and even global cascades of failures.
PACS numbers: 89.75.-k, 89.20.-a, 88.80.hh, 05.45.Xt
I. INTRODUCTION
Stable operation of complex supply networks underlies
the proper function of a broad range of biological and
technical systems. For instance in plants, supply net-
works provide nutritions and water to cells in leaves and
other plant parts [1]; the world wide web relies on stable
information distribution [2]; and electric power grids op-
erate only if electricity demand matches supply at every
point of the grid [3, 4]. Whereas supply networks in bio-
logical systems are created during development and may
be fixed after, e.g., leave damages, our technical infras-
tructure has to be constantly modernized and extended
to meet technical developments and the future demand.
One particular important example is the drastic change
of electric power supply in the upcoming decades which
provides an extraordinary challenge for the operation of
future power grids [5–7]. New transmission lines have to
be build in order to transport electric energy generated
by wind turbines and other renewable energy sources to
consumers at remote locations [8]. Due to the importance
of a stable power supply and the enormous expenses of
new transmission lines, a careful planning of the optimal
future network topology is inevitable. This planning has
to pay special regard to the collective dynamics of the
complete network – an isolated stability analysis of sin-
gle elements or local subnetworks is not sufficient [9–17].
A striking example highlighting the importance of collec-
tive effects in real supply networks is the power outage in
western Europe on 4 November 2006. Here, the manual
disconnection of one double-circuit power line in North-
ern Germany triggered power outages in many European
countries up to Spain. A main reason for this fatal mis-
planning was the inobservance of global effects beyond
the local grid and the lack of communication between
the different grid operators [18].
In this article, we analyze the collective response of
supply networks to the addition of new links and clar-
ify a surprising, yet very general effect: We show that
whereas additional links stabilize the operation of the
network on average, specific potentially new links de-
crease the total network capacity and may deteriorate
or even destroy network functionality. A similar effect in
traffic flow was described and explained by Braess in a
game theoretical framework [19, 20] and later confirmed
experimentally and numerically in different systems [21–
25]. Related phenomena were already discussed much
earlier in [26, 27]. We explicate this counter-intuitive ef-
fect, referred to as Braess’ paradox, for a range of model
supply networks: an abstract messaging model, a flow
model resembling Kirchhoff’s laws for DC networks, a
static power flow model and a dynamic oscillator model
of AC power grids [4, 28]. Interestingly, adding certain
links may not only cause cascading failures but also im-
mediate overloads in parts of the network that are remote
from the location of such links, thus indicating a non-local
impact of specific link addition.
This article is structured as follows: After providing
an intuitive explanation and a mathematical analysis of
Braess’ paradox for elementary model networks in Sec. II,
we study different aspects of this effect in large complex
networks. In Sec. III we show how the addition of new
links can lead to a major breakdown of a supply network
due to a cascading failure triggered by Braess’ paradox.
In complex networks, topological changes such as link
addition and removal can cause severe nonlocal effects
(Sec. IV). Finally we study in Sec. V which networks are
susceptible to suffer Braess’ paradox and which factors
facilitate it. The first identification of Braess’ paradox
in oscillator networks has been briefly reported recently
[29].
2FIG. 1: (color online). Braess’ paradox in an elementary mes-
saging network. In one period, each node sends one message
to each other node along the shortest path. The numbers
specify the load F of each link. If a new link is added to the
network (panel b), the load at two links adjacent to the new
link increases from F = 4.5 to F = 4.75 (red numbers).
II. BRAESS’ PARADOX IN ELEMENTARY
NETWORK MODELS
We first reveal the mechanisms underlying Braess’
paradox for small systems that allow a detailed analytic
description. We demonstrate the importance of Braess’
paradox in supply networks for four model classes: an
abstract messaging model introduced by Motter and Lai
[9], a DC power flow model, an AC power flow model and
an oscillator model for power grid dynamics introduced
by Filatrella et al. [28] for simple grids and extended
to complex networks by Rohden et al. [4]. A detailed
description of these models is provided in appendix A.
A. Braess’ paradox in messaging networks
A simple model for supply networks was introduced by
Motter and Lai [9] to study the dynamics of cascading
failures. In this model every node sends one unit of the
relevant quantity, e.g. information or electric energy, to
each other node via the shortest path in the network.
A basic example for Braess’ paradox in such a messag-
ing network is shown in Fig. 1. The loads change when
a new link is added. As expected, the total load is dis-
tributed over more links, such that the load decreases
at most links (and on average). However, there are two
edges of the network, where the load increases when the
new edge is added. If the capacity of these links is lim-
ited to K < Kc = 4.75, they will become overloaded and
drop out of service. This local failure may cause a break-
down of the complete network by a cascade of failures –
an effect which will be studied in detail in Sec. III. This
simple example already shows a basic mechanism which
triggers Braess’ paradox. When a new link is added, it
can provide a shortcut for messages. This often increases
the loads of some links connecting to the added one and
these overloaded links, in turn, drop out of service (see
also Sec. III).
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FIG. 2: (color online) Braess’ paradox in a flow model. (a)
Topology of the network. The vertices generate/consume the
power Pj = ±P . All edges have the same transmission ca-
pacity K. (b,c) Additional transmission capacity is provided
by upgrading one link (b) or adding a new link (c). (d) Load
of the link 4 ↔ 5 as a function of the additional capacity if
P is kept constant. (e) Maximum transmittable power P if
the capacity of each link is limited as Fij ≤ Kij . Results
are shown for additional capacity (scenario (b), —) and an
additional link (scenario (c), - - -).
B. Braess’ paradox in flow networks
The messaging model briefly discussed above provides
an elementary, well accessible model for supply networks,
but relies on rather specific assumptions. Supply comes
only in discrete units and is transported via the shortest
paths, regardless of the capacity of the respective links.
For general supply networks, more sophisticated models
are needed.
Now, we first consider an elementary flow model which
models, for instance, DC power grids or biological sup-
ply networks [1]. The network is specified by the trans-
mission capacity Kij > 0 between the nodes i, j ∈
{1, . . . , N}, where N denotes the number of nodes in
the network. Obviously, we have Kij = Kji and we set
Kij = 0 if no link exists between nodes i and j. Fur-
thermore, each node of the network is characterized by
the electric power Pj it generates (Pj > 0) or consumes
(Pj < 0). We denote the flow from node i to node j by
Fij , which can be positive (power flows from i to j) or
negative (power flows from j to i). The conservation of
energy then reads
N∑
j=1
Fij = Pi for all j ∈ {1, . . . , N}. (1)
In general, this condition is not sufficient to uniquely fix
the flows Fij (see appendix A2). We furthermore as-
sume that the unique steady state is determined by the
3condition that the total dissipated power
Ediss =
∑′
i<j
F 2ij
2Kij
(2)
is minimal. Here, the primed sum runs over all existing
links, i.e. all pairs (i, j) with Kij 6= 0. For DC power
grids these two conditions then imply Kirchhoff’s circuit
laws (see appendix A2).
An elementary example for the occurrence of Braess’
paradox in this flow model is shown in Fig. 2. The up-
per panels show the original network structure and two
possible scenarios of upgrading the grid – either the ca-
pacity of the upper link is increased by an amout ∆K or
another link with capacity ∆K is added. The remaining
links have a capacity K and the nodes generate (+) or
consume (−) the power P .
In the original network, a stable failure-free operation
is possible as long as P ≤ Pmax = K. On the edge of the
stability region, i.e. for P = Pmax, the following six links
are maximally loaded:
6↔ 1, 1↔ 2, 1↔ 7, 3↔ 4, 4↔ 5, 8↔ 8.
If additional transmission capacity or a new link is added
to the network as shown in Fig. 2 (b,c), the load of the
adjacent links F45 = F48 connecting to the new link in-
creases as shown in Fig. 2 (d). Hence, these links are
crucial for a failure-free operation of the complete net-
work. If the original network is already operating close
to the edge of the stability region, the addition of new
capacity or a new link can damage the links 4 ↔ 5 and
4 ↔ 8 which may then trigger a power outage in the
network. Therefore, the increase of local transmission
capacity ∆K leads to a decrease of the maximum power
Pmax which can be transmitted through the network as
shown in Fig. 2 (e). We note that Pmax decreases mono-
tonically with ∆K in this example of a linear flow net-
works whereas a different behaviour has been reported
for traffic flow models [30].
The power flow in the elementary networks analyzed
in Fig. 2 can be calculated analytically, which yields a
closed condition for a failure-free operation of the supply
network. In the following we consider the first scenario,
where the capacity of the upper link 3 ↔ 4 is increased
by an amount ∆K. The condition of flow conservation
(1) at each node gives rise to eight linear equalities for
the eight non-zero flows Fij . As one of the conditions is
redundant, there is a one-dimensional family of solutions
to the linear equations parametrized by a real number δ,
(F16, F21, F32, F43, F54, F65) = (Fa − δFb), where
Fa = P (−1,−1, 0,+1,+1, 0)
Fb = P (−2,−1,−1,+2,+1,+1). (3)
with
F71 = F21, F37 = F32,
F84 = F54 and F68 = F65. (4)
due to the symmetry of the network. Minimizing the to-
tal dissipation (2) with respect to the parameter δ yields
δ =
∆K
8K + 6∆K
, (5)
such that the load of the critical links is given by
F54 = F84 = P
8K + 7∆K
8K + 6∆K
. (6)
An overload occurs if the load is larger than the capacity
of the link, i.e. if |F54| > K. Thus we find that a failure-
free operation of the supply network is only possible if
P ≤ Pmax = K
8K + 6∆K
8K + 7∆K
. (7)
In particular, if the additional capacity ∆K increases,
the maximum transferable power Pmax decreases.
C. Braess’ paradox in a AC power grid
Braess’ paradox also occurs in AC power grids, which
provide the backbone of our technical infrastructure [3,
31]. In this section we study the static operation of a
grid in a power flow study before turning for a dynamic
model in the following section. The details of the static
flow model are described in appendix A3.
As above we consider a power grid consisting of four
generators and four identical consumers, cf. Fig. 3 (a),
assuming a nominal grid voltage of 110 kV. One gener-
ator is chosen as slack node, while the remaining ones
provide the fixed real power Pgen at the grid voltage such
that |Ugen| = 110 kV. Each consumer node consumes a
fixed real power Pcon = −10MW and a reactive power
Qcon = −3.3MVar. Hence, the power factor of the con-
sumers is λ = Pcon/
√
P 2con +Q
2
con ≈ 0.95. We assume
that the transmission lines are inductive and suffer from
ohmic losses, setting Z = (10 + 20i)Ω.
When the transmission line 2 ↔ 4 is put into opera-
tion, this can cause Braess’ paradox for the connecting
lines. Figure 3 and Tab. I show the power loads in the
network without (blue circle) and with (red squares) the
new transmission line. The load of the connecting lines
4↔ 5 and 4↔ 8 increases by 8.5 %.
We remark that the effective loss in the network, i.e.
the difference of the power generated and consumed at
the nodes, will never increase when the new transmis-
sion line is put into operation. From this point of view,
building new lines is always favorable. Still, the maxi-
mum power load of single links in the network can be
increased, decreasing the margin to outage. In extreme
situations, this may cause a shutdown of an overloaded
transmission line and finally a cascade of failures leading
to a major power outage.
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FIG. 3: (color online) Braess’ paradox in an AC power grid
in static operation. (a) Network structure of the power grid
including four consumers, three generators and a slack node.
The detailed parameters are given in the text. (b) Power
flow along each transmission line without (blue circles) and
with the additional line (red squares). The transmission lines
marked by an arrow are subject to Braess’ paradox: The max-
imum load P4,5 = P4,8 and P7,1 increase when the new line is
added to the power grid. The actual load of several transmis-
sion lines is given in Tab. I.
initial grid with additional line
Pslack 10.191 MW 10.175 MW
P4,5 = P4,8 10.04 MW 10.90 MW
P3,4 10.12 MW 7.23 MW
P2,4 0 MW 4.60 MW
TABLE I: Power generation and load of selected transmission
lines for the power grid shown in Fig. 3.
D. Braess’ paradox and desynchronization in
oscillator networks
As demonstrated recently [29], Braess’ paradox also
exists in oscillator networks. In particular, networks of
two-variable oscillators describing the dynamics of AC
power grids and thus going beyond the static regime an-
alyzed so far, typically exhibit Braess paradox for at least
a fraction of (potentially) added links. The class of os-
cillator models [4, 28] is particularly appealing as it cap-
tures several collective phenomena present in real power
grids whereas it is simple enough to admit a mechanistic
understanding of such phenomena and simulations also
for large complex networks.
In this model, both generators and consumers are as-
sumed to be synchronous machines and thus obey the
same equation of motion with a parameter P giving the
generated (P > 0) or consumed (P < 0) power. The
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FIG. 4: (color online) Braess’ paradox in an oscillator model
[29] (a-c), Topology of the network. The vertices gener-
ate/consume the power Pj = ±P . The transmission lines
have a capacity K. (d) The original network converges to a
phase-locked state. When the capacity of one link is doubled
(e), or when a new link is added to the network (f), the steady
state ceases to exist and phase synchronization breaks down.
Parameters are K = 1.03P , ∆K = K, α = P , and the initial
conditions are φj = φ˙j = 0.
state of each machine is determined by its phase an-
gle θ(t) and velocity θ˙(t). The mechanical phase of the
jth machine is written as θj(t) = ω0t + φj(t), where
ω0 = 2π × 50 s
−1 or ω0 = 2π × 60 s
−1 is the reference
frequency of the power grid. The equation of motion is
obtained via the principle of energy conservation, that is
the generated or consumed power of each element must
equal the power exchanged with the grid plus the accu-
mulated and the dissipated power. The power transmit-
ted between machines i and j is proportional to the sine
of the phase difference and the capacity of the transmis-
sion line Kij . As shown in detail in appendix A4, the
equations of motion for the phase differences then read
d2φj
dt2
= Pj − α
dφj
dt
+
∑
i
Kij sin(φi − φj). (8)
Again we first consider an analytically solvable model
network which is similar to the ones discussed in the pre-
vious sections (cf. Fig. 4). Four generators with Pj = +P
and four consumers with Pj = −P are connected by
transmission lines with capacityK. A stable steady state
exists for the original network structure (Fig. 4 (a)), if the
power is smaller than a critical value
P ≤ Pmax = K, (9)
and the system rapidly relaxes to this phase-locked state
of partial synchrony, cf. Fig. 4 (d). As in the previous
examples, the increase of the transmission capacity or
the addition of a new link can induce Braess’ paradox.
In these cases synchronization becomes impossible – the
phases φj(t) cannot phase lock as shown in Fig. 4 (e,f).
For a real power grid this effect would imply the auto-
matic shutdown of the desynchronized generators, which
may then cause a major power outage in the complete
network.
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FIG. 5: Desynchronization due to Braess’ paradox in an oscillatory power grid with complex topology [29]. (a) Topology of the
British power grid, consisting of 120 nodes and 165 transmission lines (thin black lines) [12]. Ten nodes are randomly selected
to be generators (Pj = 11P0, ), the others are consumers (Pj = −P0, ◦). The dashed new link causes desynchronization
due to Braess’ paradox. (b) Power flow in the original network for K = 13P0. The load of several transmission lines in the
neighborhood of the new link is already close to the maximum capacity K. (c) For K = 13P0 and α = P0, the initial network
converges to a phase-locked steady state. (d) Synchronization becomes impossible after the new link has been added. The
initial condition is fully synchrony, φj = φ˙j = 0.
The loss of synchrony in an oscillator network due to
Braess’ paradox is a rather subtle effect. The condition
for the existence of a phase-locked steady state in the
power grid model φj = φ˙j = 0 is equivalent to the con-
servation of the flow
N∑
j=1
Fij = Pi ∀i = 1, . . . , Nn. (10)
For the oscillator model, the power flows are given by
Fij = Kij sin(φj − φi). (11)
Therefore, we can divide the condition for the existence
of a phase-locked steady state into a dynamic and a geo-
metric component. In addition to the conservation of the
flow (10) we have to satisfy a geometric condition: For
every cyclic path in the network, the sum of all phase dif-
ferences must vanish such that all phases are well-defined,∑′
(φj − φi) =
∑′
arcsin(Fji/Kji) = 0 (mod 2π).
(12)
The prime indicates that the sum is taken along a cyclic
path. For the networks shown in Fig. 4 one can easily find
values Fij which satisfy flow conservation, cf. Eq. (3), but
the condition (12) is no longer fulfilled. For such Fij ’s,
despite the fact that all dynamical conditions (10) are
satisfied, no steady state exists due to geometric frustra-
tion, the incapability of the system to satisfy (12) along
all cycles of the network. In fact, the critical coupling
strength Kc for the existence of a phase-locked state is
increased. Thus geometric frustration limits the capabil-
ity of the network to support a steady state.
Braess’ paradox in oscillator networks is rooted in the
geometric frustration of small cycles, which are generally
present in most complex networks [29]. We speculate that
condition (12) is more often satisfied along long cycles
because these have a larger number of variables, i.e. the
restriction can be “solved” in higher-dimensional space
of phase differences. Braess’ paradox occurs in many,
but not all complex networks as elementary cycles are
typically overlapping such that the effects of geometric
frustration depend on the precise network topology and
are as such hard to predict.
As an important example, we consider the British high-
voltage power transmission grid shown in Fig. 5, cf. [12].
In our study, we randomly choose ten out of 120 nodes
to be generators (Pj = +11P0), while the remaining ones
are consumers (Pj = −P0). For K = 13P0 the original
network relaxes to a phase-locked steady state as shown
in part (c) of the figure. If one inappropriate new link is
added (dashed black line), global synchronization (phase
locking) is lost due to Braess’ paradox for the given cou-
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ij of all links in a color code. The link colored in black is added to the network. The remaining panels
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which are not nearest neighbors of the additional link which triggers the cascading failure. These links are marked by arrows
in step 1 and 2. In this simulation we have used the coarse grained structure of the British power grid with 120 nodes and 165
edges as described in [12]. The tolerance parameter is α = 0.32.
pling strength K. Instead, the power grid decomposes
into two asynchronous fragments as shown in part (d) of
the figure.
Furthermore, this example emphasizes the importance
of the lines connecting to the newly added one: These
lines may easily become overloaded when the new edge
is added to the network, finally causing a system wide
failure. In particular, also lines indirectly connecting to
the newly added one may be affected in a similar way.
Figure 5 (b) shows the power flow in the steady state
before the new link is added. One observes that several
transmission lines in the neighborhood of the new link are
heavily loaded. These lines get overloaded when the new
link is put into operation, causing the desynchronization
of the grid. Generally, adding new transmission lines are
assumed to most strongly change the load distribution in
the network if they are build in regions where the existing
lines are already heavily loaded. In fact, loads are often
thought to be reduced due to the new line. However,
load redistribution is not necessarily supportive, as shown
above. For more details on the physics of Braess’ paradox
in oscillator networks, see also [29].
III. CASCADING FAILURES TRIGGERED BY
THE ADDITION OF LINKS
The messaging model studied in Sec. II A was initially
introduced to study how the damage of a single link can
induce a major failure in large parts of the grid [9, 12].
This scenario is very important for real supply networks,
in particular for power grids, as most major power out-
ages are the result of a cascade of failures. A prominent
example is the power outage in the western European
power grid on November 4th 2006, which was triggered
by the shutdown of one double-circuit transmission lines
over the river Ems in north-western Germany [18]. As
a consequence ten million households were disconnected
7from the power supply. Power outages even occurred in
Spain, approximately 2000 km away from the cause of
the cascading failure. In this section we show that not
only the removal or damage of at single transmission line,
but also the addition of a new transmission line can cause
a cascading failure due to Braess’ paradox.
An example for a cascading failure by link addition is
shown in Fig. 6. Again, we consider the coarse grained
structure of the British power grid with 120 nodes and
165 link [12]. The upper left panel shows the load F
(0)
ij
of each link of the initial network in a colormap plot. As
in the original model [9], we assume that the capacity of
each link is adapted to the loads
Kij = (1 + α)F
(0)
ij (13)
with a tolerance parameter α ≥ 0. If the load Fij exceeds
the capacity Kij , then the link becomes overloaded and
drops out of service, i.e. it is removed from the network.
Now we consider the effect of the addition of a new
link to the network. The new link is colored in black
and marked by an arrow in in the upper left panel of
Fig. 6. We assume that the new link has a rather high
capacity Knew = maxij(Kij). The upper middle panel
then shows how the loads of all links changes after the
addition of this link. As expected from the study of the
elementary model in Sec. II A, the load of the connecting
lines along the western coast increases. For α = 0.32,
only a single link becomes overloaded which is colored in
black and marked by an arrow. This failure then again
causes a redistribution of the loads in the network and
the overload of another link. This finally triggers a whole
cascade of failure as shown in the remaining panels of
Fig. 6. After six steps, the cascade stops and the net-
work is decomposed into 13 different components. The
largest component includes 85 nodes, while 6 nodes are
completely disconnected.
An important question is how crucial the addition of
a new link is in general, in particular in comparison to
the removal of a single links. To answer this question,
we have simulated the impact of cascading failures as
a function of the tolerance parameter α for the coarse
grained structure of the British power grid. A single link
is added or removed at random positions in the network
and we analyze the final structure of the network after the
cascade of failures has come to an end. Figure 7 shows
the size of the largest connected component G relative
to the size of the initial network. The simulations reveal
a surprising result: Link addition has even more severe
consequences than link removal in the sense that it leads
to smaller values of G/G0. However, this effect is partly
due the fact that links are added at completely random
positions such that they generally connect distant areas
of the network. Obviously, this can have a stronger ef-
fect on the network flow than the ’local’ removal of a
link. The addition of links at random positions is also
rather unrealistic. Thus we also consider an alternative
scenario where links can be added only between nodes
with a distance of two. The numerical results (Fig. 7,
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FIG. 7: (color online) How harmful are single link changes?
Characterization of the final state after a cascading failure in
the messaging model. Plotted is the relative size of the largest
connected component G/G0 in the final state, i.e. the final
size divided by the initial size as a function of the tolerance
parameter α. We consider the addition of links at random
positions (blue circles), the addition of links at local position
(green squares) and the removal of links (red diamonds). Lo-
cal position means that a link is added between two random
nodes with initial graph distance of 2. In this simulation we
have used the coarse grained structure of the British power
grid with 120 nodes and 165 edges as described in [12]. Re-
sults have been averaged over 200 random positions (for local
and global random addition of links) and over all 165 existing
links (removal of links). The shaded (blue) area shows the
standard deviation for the cases of link addition at random
position.
green squares) reveal that such a local addition of links
has a less severe effect than the removal of links, but both
can be substantial.
IV. NONLOCAL IMPACT OF LINK ADDITION
AND REMOVAL
Cascading failure events such as those illustrated in
Fig. 6 highlight that a single link addition may induce
strong nonlocal impacts. In the example (Fig. 6), the
cascade is triggered by the addition of a link in Scotland.
The load of the connecting links is strongly modified, also
beyond the immediate neighborhood of the novel link.
In particular, a rather weak link located in northeastern
England becomes overloaded, while the links in the im-
mediate neighborhood remain in operation. In the second
step, one link at an even further distance becomes over-
loaded. Finally, several nodes in southeastern England
are fully disconnected from the network – nodes which
are far away from the link which caused the failure.
The example shown in Fig. 6 is surely extreme, but a
strong nonlocal impact triggered by changes of the net-
work topology is by no means exceptional: To analyze
the geographic properties of cascading failures quantita-
tively, we calculate the distance between the overloaded
81 3 5 7 9 11 13
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
distance
to
ta
l n
um
be
r
(a)
1 3 5 7 9 11 13
0
50
100
150
200
distance
(b)
1 3 5 7 9 11 13
0
50
100
150
200
distance
to
ta
l n
um
be
r
(c)
FIG. 8: Nonlocal impact of link addition and removal (here:
in the messaging model). (a-c) Histograms of the distances
of the initially added/removed link to the links which become
overloaded the first step. We consider (a) the addition of
links at random positions, (b) the addition of links at local
position and (c) the removal of links. Note that the distance
is defined in terms of the original unmodified network in the
case of link removal. For link addition, distance is defined
in terms of the modified network, i.e. the network including
the additional link. In this simulation we have used the coarse
grained structure of the British power grid with 120 nodes and
165 edges as described in [12]. Results have been collected for
200 random positions.
links and the added/removed link, which causes the over-
load. Figure 8 shows a histogram of these distance for
the first step of the cascade. As above, we consider three
scenarios: (a) the addition of a link at a random position,
(b) the local addition of a link and (c) the removal of a
link. For scenarios (a) and (c) it is observed that over-
loads frequently occur at remote positions. In the case of
link removal, the next-to-nearest neighbors are even more
vulnerable to an overload than the nearest neighbors. If
link addition is restricted to a local position (scenario b),
then also the immediate impact occurs predominantly at
local positions. However, the dynamic consequences of-
ten reach beyond the local neighborhood in the network.
Already in the second step of the cascade (not shown),
almost no differences can be observed between the three
different scenarios.
We note that these findings do not contradict the claim
that the connecting lines are crucial for the possibility of
Braess’ paradox. They rather show that we have to con-
sider the connecting lines beyond the immediate neigh-
borhood, too. In particular, in the example studied in
Fig. 6, one can identify a rather long path of connecting
lines, whose load strongly increases after the addition of
the new link (the red link in the upper middle panel in
Fig. 6). The overload then occurs on the weakest of these
links, not on the nearest.
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FIG. 9: (color online) Prevalence of Braess’ paradox across
different topologies: Randomized ring lattices (blue circles,
[32]), randomized square lattices (red squares, [33]) and net-
works with algebraic degree distribution (green diamonds,
[34]). Plotted is the fraction of links whose removal leads
to a decrease of the maximum flow Fmax as a function of (a)
the network size (q = 0.1) and (b) the topological random-
ness of the network (N = 200). The shaded blue area shows
the standard deviation for the randomized ring lattices. Solid
lines are drawn to guide the eye. Random networks which
are not globally connected were discarded, in particular there
is no data point at q = 1 as random networks with average
degree d = 4 are almost always disconnected.
V. BRAESS’ PARADOX ON COMPLEX
NETWORK TOPOLOGIES
Braess’ paradox arises for different models of supply
networks and can have severe consequences for the oper-
ation of the network. We now show that in large com-
plex networks this phenomenon is the rule rather than
the exception. We systematically study the occurrence of
Braess’ paradox for the flow model introduced in Sec. II B
and analyze how this behavior depends on the size and
topology of the network.
To analyze how topological changes impact network
dynamics for different classes of random networks, we
first consider classes of networks that interpolate between
regular and random topology, also referred to as small-
world networks [32, 33]. Starting with a ring lattice where
each node is connected to its nearest and next-to-nearest
neighbors or a square lattice, every link is rewired with
probability q, i.e. removed and re-inserted at a different
randomly chosen position. Furthermore we consider net-
works with an algebraic degree distribution generated by
random preferential attachment [34]. The average degree
is d = 4 for the randomized lattices and d = 4− 4/N ≈ 4
for the algebraic network. In each case, half of the nodes
9are randomly chosen to be generators (Pj = +P0) or
consumers (Pj = −P0).
We then check for each link how its removal affects the
maximum flow Fmax = maxij |Fij | in the network. A link
is said to induce Braess’ paradox if Fmax decreases after
the removal. This definition is exactly the same as above
as the re-addition of the link would increase Fmax which
could then cause a fatal overload. For each random net-
work we count the number of links which induce Braess’
paradox and average over one-hundred realizations of the
network structure. We then analyze how this number de-
pends on the size and topology of the networks.
The numerical results plotted in Fig. 9 demonstrate
that Braess’ paradox is common in complex flow net-
works. For large networks with 200 nodes, more than 40
% of the links impede the operation of the the supply
network in the way that their removal is beneficial as it
decreases the maximum load Fmax. However, the impact
of a single link decreases with the total number of links
present in the network. Therefore, the magnitude of the
change of Fmax is generally smaller for larger networks,
see Fig. 10 (b) where we have plotted a histogram for the
difference of the maximum loads before and after the link
removal
∆Fmax = Fmax,after − Fmax,before. (14)
for a small (N = 16) and a large (N = 196) network.
One clearly sees that the probability for large changes
∆Fmax is extremely small for the larger network.
Furthermore, Braess’ paradox prevails across all types
of network topologies and model dynamics considered
here. For large networks, the topology has only a minor
influence on the probability that a link induces Braess’
paradox. Even more, the probability is almost indepen-
dent of the topological randomness q as shown in Fig. 9
(b). However, topological changes have a more severe
impact in networks with a regular topology as shown in
Fig. 10 (a), where we compare the difference of the max-
imum flow ∆Fmax before and after links removal for a
randomized square lattice with q = 0.005 (close to reg-
ular) and q = 0.5 (close to random). The probability
for large values of Fmax is much larger for the regular
network with q = 0.005.
In conclusion we find that the probability to observe
Braess’ paradox is almost independent of the of the net-
work topology and increases with the network size. How-
ever, the impact of a single link is largest for regular
structures and decreases with the network size. This find-
ing is consistent with the results for oscillator networks
discussed in [29].
VI. DISCUSSION
We have revealed and analyzed Braess’ paradox for dif-
ferent models of supply networks: Against the naive intu-
ition, the addition of new connections in a network does
not always increase the overall transmission capacity of
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FIG. 10: (color online) Impact of link removal on the maxi-
mum flow in a supply network. Histogram displays the dif-
ference of the maximum flow ∆Fmax before and after link
removal (14) for randomized square lattices [33] with (a)
N = 100 and two different values of q and (b) q = 0.1 and two
different values of N . A negative difference ∆Fmax indicates
Braess’ paradox.
the network. An elementary model system was designed
to analytically study this paradoxical behavior, while nu-
merical simulations have revealed that a substantial frac-
tion of potential links induce this deleterious transition.
Furthermore, we have shown that catastrophic failures of
complex supply networks may not only be caused by fail-
ures of single elements or links but also by the addition
of single links. In particular, networks may destabilize
due to a non-local overload.
Future model studies must include the detailed struc-
ture of supply networks as well as the spatial and tem-
poral heterogeneity of generation and demand. For in-
stance, both the consumption and generation of elec-
tric energy in modern power grids is strongly fluctuat-
ing. This notwithstanding, Braess’ paradox is a general
feature such that it can play a crucial role in real supply
networks. In the future, it will be of great scientific as
well as economic interest to understand how these phe-
nomena depend on the topologies of the underlying net-
works in detail, cf. [15, 35–37]. In particular, a badly
designed electric power grid subject to Braess’ paradox
may cause enormous costs for new but counterproductive
electric power lines that actually reduce grid performance
and stability.
While Braess’ paradox has been observed in real-world
traffic networks in several locations [21–25], its effects
are less apparent for different types of supply networks.
For instance, power grids are usually operated far from
their load limit such that local structural changes do not
cause obvious global failures. However, periods of ex-
treme load do occur and are expected to become more
likely in future power grids with many strongly fluctu-
ating renewable energy sources. In such a period of ex-
treme load, small local changes of the network structure
may cause a global breakdown. For instance, there was a
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significant East-West power flows in the european power
grid on 4 November 2006 because of a large wind feed-
in in Germany. In this situtation, the disconnection of
one double-circuit transmission line in Nothern Germany
was sufficient to trigger a global power outage in most of
western europe [18] A key result of this work is that in
such a situation the addition of a new link can be just as
fatal as the disconnection of an existing one.
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Appendix A: Models of supply networks
In this appendix we provide a detailed description
of the different models of supply networks used in the
present paper.
1. Messaging model
A popular model to study the stability of supply and
communication networks, in particular the vulnerability
to cascading failures, has been introduced by Motter and
Lai [9]. In contrast to the original study we focus on the
links in the network, not the nodes. In particular, we
assume that a link drops out of service if it is overloaded,
while the nodes are not affected.
The messaging model assumes that at each time step,
one unit of information or energy is send from each node
to each other node in the connected component along the
shortest path. The load of each link Fij is then given by
the number of shortest paths running over this link i↔ j,
which is nothing than the edge betweenness centrality.
Furthermore, it is assumed, that the capacity of each link
proportional to the load of the link in the initial intact
network,
Kij = (1 + α)F
(0)
ij . (A1)
Here, the superscript (0) denotes the intact network.
Then Motter and Lai analyze what happens if one link
is damaged. Obviously the other links have to take over
the load such that Fij will generally increase. If the load
exceeds the capacity of a link, Fij > Kij , then this link
will also drop out of service, which can trigger a cascade
of failures disconnecting the entire grid.
2. Flow model
One of the simplest models of supply networks consid-
ers only the flow between different elements of the net-
work. A similar model has also been used to model bi-
ological flow models in [1]. The power grid is specified
by the transmission capacity Kij > 0 between the nodes
i, j ∈ {1, . . . , N}, where N denotes the number of nodes
in the network. Obviously, we have Kij = Kji and we
set Kij = 0 if no link exists between nodes i and j. Fur-
thermore, each node of the network is characterized by
the electric power Pj it generates (Pj > 0) or consumes
(Pj < 0).
We denote the flow from node i to node j by Fij , which
can be positive (power flows from i to j) or negative
(power flows from j to i). The conservation of energy
then directly leads to the condition
N∑
j=1
Fij = Pi for all j ∈ {1, . . . , N}. (A2)
In general, energy conservation is not sufficient to
uniquely fix the flows, as it poses only N − 1 linearly
independent constraints for the L independent non-zero
variables Fij , L being the number of links in the network.
The unique steady state is determined by the condition
that the total dissipated power
Ediss =
∑′
i<j
F 2ij
2Kij
(A3)
should be minimal. In this expression, the primed sum
runs only over existing transmission lines, i.e. only over
links with Kij 6= 0. To minimize this expression respect-
ing the conservation of energy, we use the method of La-
grangian multipliers, i.e. we minimize
L =
∑
i<j
F 2ij
2Kij
−
∑
i
λi
∑
j
Fij − Pi

=
∑
i<j
(
F 2ij
2Kij
− (λi − λj)Fij
)
. (A4)
Minimization yields the condition
∂L
∂Fij
= K−1ij Fij − (λi − λj)
!
= 0
⇒ Fij = Kij(λi − λj) (A5)
Thus, the flow from i to j is given by a potential dif-
ference λi − λj multiplied by the transmission capacity
Kij . Substituting this result into equation (A2), we find
that the potential is determined by a linear system of
equations ∑
j
Kij(λi − λj) = Pi. (A6)
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for convenience, we rewrite this system of equations in a
vectorial form
K˜~λ = − ~P (A7)
where we have defined the matrix elements
K˜ij = Kij −
(∑
k
Kik
)
δij (A8)
and the vectors ~P and ~λ collect the values of the power
generated/consumed in each node Pj and the potentials
λj .
We note that the oscillator model (A17) reduces to this
model in the steady state, when the phase differences
are so small that one can approximate sin(φi − φj) ≈
φi − φj , which is typically the case if the couplings Kij
are very large. The power flow model can thus be seen
as a limiting case of the oscillator model.
3. Static flow in AC power grids
In an AC power grid, one has to take into account that
not only real but also reactive power is transmitted via
the network. Each link of the grid is characterized by
its complex impedance, not just its maximum transmis-
sion capacity. In a static power flow study one calculates
the voltage of each node such that the electric power is
conserved at each node [31].
Every node a is characterized by its voltage Ua com-
pared to the ground. A transmission line between the
nodes a and b carries the current
Ia,b =
1
Za,b
(Ua − Ub), (A9)
where Za,b is the impedance of the line. The electric
power transmitted from or two a node of the network is
then given by
Sa =
∑
b
Sa,b =
∑
b
3UaI
∗
a,b, (A10)
where the star denotes complex conjugation. The real
part gives the real transmitted power Pa, while the imag-
inary part Qa is the reactive power,
Sa = Pa + iQa . (A11)
Power conservation requires that the total transmitted
power equals the power generated or consumed at the
respective node:
Sa = Sa,source . (A12)
In our study we distinguish three types of nodes; gen-
erators, consumers and a slack node. Every node imposes
two conditions depending on its type:
• Generator nodes have a fixed nominal voltage and
provide a fixed real power:
Pa
!
= Pa,source, |Ua|
!
= |Ua,source|.
• Consumers are defined by fixed values of the real
and reactive power:
Pa
!
= Pa,source, Qa
!
= Qa,source .
• Furthermore, one introduces a slack node which is
an ideal voltage source with the nominal voltage of
the grid, i.e. the magnitude and the phase of the
voltage are fixed:
Ua
!
= Ua,source.
The slack node compensates any unbalanced real
or reactive power in the network.
In a power grid with N elements, one thus has to solve
2N algebraic nonlinear equations for the 2N free vari-
ables ℜ(Ua), ℑ(Ua), a ∈ {1, . . . , N}. Given the volt-
ages Ua one can easily calculate the power flows Sa,b via
Eq. (A10).
4. Oscillator model
We consider a power grid model consisting of N rotat-
ing machines j ∈ {1, . . . , N} representing, for instance,
wind turbines, or electric motors [3, 4, 28]. Each ma-
chine is characterized by the electric power Pj it generates
(Pj > 0) or consumes (Pj < 0). The state of each ma-
chine is determined by its mechanical phase angle θj(t)
and its velocity dθj/dt. During the regular operation,
generators as well as consumers within the grid run with
the same frequency ω0 = 2π×50 s
−1 or ω0 = 2π×60 s
−1,
respectively. The phase of each element is then written
as
θj(t) = ω0t+ φj(t), (A13)
where φj denotes the phase difference to the reference
phase ω0t.
The equation of motion for all φj can now be obtainend
from energy conservation, that is the generated or con-
sumed energy Psource,j of each machine must equal the
energy sum given or taken from the grid plus the accu-
mulated and dissipated energy. The dissipation power
of each element is given by Pdiss,j = κj(θ˙j)
2, where κ
is a friction coefficient. The kinetic energy of a rotat-
ing machine with a moment of inertia Ij is given by
Ekin,j = Ij θ˙
2/2 such that the accumulated power is given
by Pacc,j = dEkin,j/dt. The power transmitted between
two machines i and j is proportional to the sine of the rel-
ative phase sin(θi−θj) and the capacity of the respective
transmission line Pmax,ij ,
Ptrans,ij = Pmax,ij sin(θi − θj). (A14)
If there is no transmission line between two machines, we
have Pmax,ij = 0. The condition of energy conservation
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at each node j of the network now reads
Psource,j = Pdiss,j + Pacc,j +
N∑
i=1
Ptrans,ij . (A15)
Note that an energy flow between two elements is only
possible if there is a phase difference between these two.
We now insert equation (A13) to obtain the evolution
equations for the phase difference φj . We can assume
that phase changes are slow compared to the set fre-
quency, |θ˙j | ≪ ω0, such that terms containing φ˙
2
j and
φ˙j φ¨j can be neglected. Then one obtains
Ijω0φ¨j = Psource,j−κjω
2
0−2κjω0φ˙j+
N∑
i=1
Pmax,ij sin(φi−φj).
(A16)
Note that in the equation only the phase difference φj to
the reference phase ω0t appears. This shows that only the
phase difference between the elements of the grid matters.
For the sake of simplicity we consider similar machines
only such that the moment of inertia Ij and the friction
coefficient κj are the same for all elements of the network.
Defining Pj := (Psource,j − κω
2
0)/(Iω0), α := 2κ/I and
Kij := Pmax,ij/(Iω0) this finally leads to the equation of
motion
d2φj
dt2
= Pj − α
dφj
dt
+
∑
i
Kij sin(φi − φj) . (A17)
Unless stated otherwise, we assume that all transmission
lines are equal, that is
Kij =
{
K if a link exists between nodes i and j
0 otherwise.
(A18)
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